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A GRAND THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW? 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF­
GOVERNMENT. By Jeb Rubenfeld. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
2001. Pp. 255. $35. 
Jeb Rubenfeld's book is nothing if not ambitious.1 In just 250 
pages, Rubenfeld seeks to: justify the authority of the Constitution, es­
tablish the legitimacy of judicial review, resolve the counter­
majoritarian difficulty, offer a method of constitutional interpretation 
and judicial review, uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action, 
and explain the legitimacy of judicial protection of privacy, including 
abortion rights. Scattered throughout the book, he offers philosophical 
insights as to the meaning of life, discussing a central issue for all of us: 
dealing with time. Rubenfeld's book is elegant, relying on history,2 
continental philosophy,3 game theory,4 and even Supreme Court cases, 
to support his theory. 
As a reader, I very much want for Rubenfeld to succeed. I agree 
with almost all of his conclusions.5 No doubt, it would be wonderful to 
have a theory that resolves the counter-majoritarian difficulty, justifies 
nonoriginalist judicial review, and supports affirmative action and 
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, 
University of Southern California. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed. 
1 .  Jeb Rubenfeld is the Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale Law School. 
2. See, e.g. , pp. 22-24. 
3. See, e.g., pp. 34-41, 147-48 (discussing Habermas), 9-10, 75-76 (discussing Derrida), 
234-43 (discussing Foucault). 
4. See, e.g., pp. 27-28, 102-15 (discussing Kenneth Arrow and the application of his theo­
rem to law). 
5. I disagree with only some of his conclusions. For example, Rubenfeld says that he 
does not think that there should be constitutional protection for the right to marry. 
P. 245. As one who believes that the liberty of the due process clause safeguards fundamen­
tal rights relating to privacy and personhood, I disagree and believe that the right to marry 
properly has been safeguarded by the Court as a fundamental right. See, e.g. , Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (constitutional protection 
of the right to marry). More importantly, I disagree with Rubenfeld's conception of strict 
scrutiny. I see strict scrutiny as a form of balancing, with the weights on the scales being set 
against the government's action. Rubenfeld, as part of his paradigm case method of constitu­
tional interpretation, sees strict scrutiny as absolutely prohibiting certain government actions 
and justifications. Pp. 202-03. I discuss Rubenfeld's paradigm case method of interpretation 
in Section 11.C, below. 
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abortion rights. If Rubenfeld succeeded, progressive law professors 
could forever retire from engaging in constitutional theory, except to 
refine, apply, and defend his approach. 
And if this is not enough, Rubenfeld claims to accomplish this by 
rejecting all of the constitutional theories that have been previously 
developed. The book jacket quotes Bruce Ackerman as stating, "This 
brilliant book heralds a new era in constitutional thought." 
Unfortunately, if Rubenfeld's claims seem too good to be true, it is 
because they are. On careful examination, many key steps in 
Rubenfeld's argument have serious problems. Some aspects of 
Rubenfeld's analysis are simply rephrasings of familiar arguments in 
constitutional theory. Others, such as his "paradigm case" theory of 
judicial review, are so inadequately developed as to be of little help in 
understanding how courts should decide cases. 
Rubenfeld's book is similar to efforts by Albert Einstein and other 
famous physicists to develop a "unified" theory accounting for all 
physical forces. Even Einstein failed at this effort and most physicists 
seem skeptical that a "unified field" theory ever can be developed. 
Likewise, reading Rubenfeld's book heightens my skepticism that 
there ever can be a grand theory of constitutional law of the sort he 
seeks. 
Part I of this Review summarizes Rubenfeld's thesis and his argu­
ments. Part II considers the key steps in Rubenfeld's argument and 
the problems with it. Finally, Part III concludes by offering final 
thoughts about the role of constitutional theory. 
I. RUBENFELD'S THESIS 
At the risk of oversimplifying, I see six major steps in Rubenfeld's 
analysis. 
(1) The traditional approach to constitutional law is "speech ori­
ented," meaning defining democracy as having government follow the 
voices of the current majority of society. Rubenfeld argues that society 
is obsessed with living in the present. He says that "[t]he proliferation 
of the imperative to live in the present . . .  can be seen in a wide vari­
ety of modem practices, institutions, styles, and literatures" (p. 26). He 
says that in the realm of government this means that democracy is un­
derstood as the imperative for government to follow the will of the 
current majority of society. This is what he means by "speech ori­
ented." Rubenfeld writes that "a . . .  predominant conception of self­
govemment . . .  call[ ed] speech-modeled of which the organizing term 
is government by the present will or voice of the governed" (p. 74). He 
says that "[t]he idea that the earth belongs to the living would have us 
govern ourselves by our own present will" (p. 143). In other words, 
Rubenfeld finds the definition of democracy as majority rule as de-
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rived from a focus on the current majority and the need to follow its 
voice. 
(2) A "speech-oriented" approach to constitutional law creates the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty. Four decades ago, Alexander Bickel 
wrote of judicial review being a deviant institution in American soci­
ety.6 Bickel wrote of the counter-majoritarian difficulty: constitutional 
judicial review involves unelected judges striking down the choices by 
popularly elected legislatures.7 If democracy is defined as majority rule 
- or as Rubenfeld puts it, if government is thought of in "speech" 
terms -judicial review is inherently at odds with democracy. 
Countless books and articles have been written about this, includ­
ing many that offer their own solutions to reconciling judicial review 
with democracy. Originalists, for example, argue that their theory is 
best because it limits the situations in which courts usurp the popular 
will to only those situations where the Constitution's text and intent 
are clear.8 Perhaps most famously, John Hart Ely's book Democracy 
and Distrust begins on page one by defining democracy as majority 
rule and then purports to reconcile judicial review with it by having 
courts focus on perfecting the processes of government.9 
Rubenfeld argues that every model of judicial review is fatally 
flawed because it is founded on a speech-oriented approach. 
Rubenfeld reviews major approaches - social contract analysis, origi­
nalism, proceduralism, consent theory, and liberalism - and shows 
how none succeeds in solving the· counter-majoritarian difficulty. He 
says that the "antimony built into the very logic of the speech-modeled 
ideal of self-government makes that ideal presuppose what it cannot 
accept: the presence of texts, enacted in the past, governing the polity 
on fundamental matters of justice today and in the future" (p. 75). 
(3) The Constitution instead should be seen as a written commitment 
over time. Rubenfeld sees his alternative view of the Constitution as 
being about enduring commitments, and he derives this from the fact 
that the document is written. He writes: 
Self-government cannot be an exercise merely of freedom of speech and 
all that freedom of speech entails (political dialogue, formation of the 
'public will, ' responsiveness of the representatives to the 'voice of the 
people.') Self-government requires an inscriptive politics, a politics that 
exercises the freedom to write, a politics oriented around the production 
6. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). 
7. Id. at 16-20. 
8. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 
(1996); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 
(1971). 
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST (1980). 
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and enforcement of a democratic text laying down principles and institu­
tions for generations to come. (p. 86) 
He says that the Constitution is a "conception of self-government 
as living out, over time, commitments of one's own authorship" 
(p. 14). Later he explains this by stating: "[T]he defining th.esis of self­
government on the model of writing [is] the self that governs itself 
over time is governed by commitments of its own making, apart from 
or even contrary to its will at any given moment" (p. 92). 
In other words, there are three basic elements to Rubenfeld's con­
ception of the Constitution: it is a commitment; it is expressed in 
writing; and it is meant to last over time. He discusses, in detail, types 
of commitments that people make. He explains the importance of a 
written, as opposed to a speech-based approach to government. Un­
like a speech-founded orientation, which is committed to following the 
will of the present majority, a written Constitution is not so oriented. 
Most importantly, he says that understanding the Constitution re­
quires that it be seen as extending over time and thus transcending the 
present-oriented approach to government that he earlier criticizes. In­
deed, a central focus of his book concerns time and how focusing on it 
changes our understanding of the Constitution. 
(4) Viewing the Constitution as written warrants its existence, justi­
fies judicial review, and solves the counter-majoritarian difficulty. The 
obvious objection to Rubenfeld's argument is that those who are now 
alive did not ratify the Constitution. Why should they be seen as hav­
ing made the commitment that he describes? This is particularly im­
portant because Rubenfeld criticizes those who have described the 
Constitution as an effort of society to tie its hands so that short-term 
impulses do not cause a compromise of long-term values.10 Some, such 
as Jon Elster, have used the story of Ulysses and the Sirens, where 
Ulysses had his hands tied to the mast to prevent him from indulging 
in the desire to follow the Siren song, as a metaphor for the 
Constitution.11 Rubenfeld, though, says that the problem with this 
view is that those now alive did not choose to tie themselves to this 
mast; it was a choice made by past generations and what right do they 
have to tie future ones? (pp. 93-94). Moreover, Rubenfeld argues that 
the analogy to Ulysses does not provide a normative reason why the 
commitment should be honored (pp. 1 16-17). 
But why doesn't Rubenfeld's conception of commitment and a 
written constitution run afoul of the same problems? He says that it is 
because there is such a thing as the American "people" that exists 
over time (p. 131). Of course, the individuals change, as they die and 
10. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H: TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-23 (3d ed. 
2000). 
11 .  JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 94-96 (1984). 
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new persons move ·in and are born. But Rubenfeld says that even a 
single person changes; he writes that "we are composed of many dif­
ferent selves not at a particular moment, but over time" (p. 131). 
Rubenfeld says that just as an individual changes, but retains his or her 
status as a person, so can "people" change, but retain a common unity. 
He says "the way we solve the problem of unity of the subject over 
time, in the case of persons, is by recognizing that human subjects oc­
cupy time as well as space . . . .  The idea of human-being as being­
over-time completes the work necessary to situate commitment to 
human freedom" (pp. 139-40). 
Therefore, since there is an American people - of which we are 
all a part - and it has committed itself to the Constitution, we, in the 
present generation, have done so too. This commitment is not just 
made by those in the past, but by a timeless "people" of which we are 
a part. In a particularly important passage, Rubenfeld writes: "Today 
we are all Jews and blacks; we are all minorities infesting a region that 
others wish they could have for themselves. We are also members of a 
historical people taking part in that nation's sins and glories" (p. 159). 
Rubenfeld says that this justifies judicial review because it exists to 
uphold and enforce our own commitments. He says that 
"[c]onstitutional interpretation cannot be vested in organs of govern­
ment beholden to or expressing popular will" (p. 173). He says that 
the judiciary is "the only branch positioned to exercise the interpretive 
power in such a way as to avoid collapsing into an exercise of present 
democratic will" (pp. 172-73). 
Rubenfeld argues that this conception of the Constitution solves 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty because it is our own commitment 
that is the basis for invalidating laws conflicting with the Constitution. 
He boldly proclaims that "[c]onstitutionalism as democracy undoes all 
of the theoretical perplexities that have so confounded contemporary 
constitutional thought" (p. 163). He says that understanding the 
Constitution as our own commitment eliminates the need to see judi­
cial review as a deviant institution in American society. He writes: 
"The cardinal rule of this interpretive task is that interpretation of 
commitments cannot be permitted to collapse into governance by the 
self's present will. In saying what commitments require, we are obliged 
not to rationalize our way, under guise of 'interpretation,' to whatever 
we wanted to do in the first place" (p. 173). 
(5) In interpreting the Constitution, courts should follow the "para­
digm case method." Rubenfeld says that his view of the Constitution 
leads to a new way of thinking of judicial review; he terms this the 
"paradigm case method." He explains this by stating: 
Rules and concepts can take on meaning by reference to their "paradigm 
case": their central or most clearly established instances .... "Paradigm 
cases" are so called because they do paradigmatic duty. They furnish 
fixed points of reference. They are the exemplars, the building blocks, 
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out of which doctrine is to be built. (pp. 180-81) 
Rubenfeld does not claim that the paradigm case method will offer 
determinative answers in most constitutional cases. He says, though, 
that it often will "rule out" a proposed interpretation of the Constitu­
tion (p. 194). He applies his paradigm case method to justify the 
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.12 
Rubenfeld says that no other theory of constitutional interpretation 
can justify Brown. He says, though, that if the Fourteenth Amendment 
is understood as being about eliminating the black codes in the South 
that followed the Civil War, then Brown follows from this paradigm. 
He writes: "The paradigm case method holds that the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is secured, and its proper interpretation 
shaped, by the paradigmatic instance of its application" (p. 182). He 
says that the paradigm case of the Fourteenth Amendment is an anti­
caste principle and that laws mandating segregation of the races run 
afoul of it. 
(6) Application of the paradigm case method justifies the constitu­
tionality of affirmative action and judicial protection of privacy, in­
cluding abortion rights. In the last two chapters of the book, 
Rubenfeld applies his theory to particular, controversial constitutional 
issues. In Chapter Eleven, he considers sex discrimination and race 
preferences. Initially, he explains why the equal protection clause is 
properly understood as prohibiting sex discrimination, even though 
this was not within the intent of the provision's drafters (pp. 197-99). 
He then tackles the harder topic: the constitutional permissibility of 
affirmative action. 
He begins by makirig the powerful point that the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment endorsed affirmative action efforts. He notes: 
The judges and scholars who most prominently oppose affirmative ac­
tion, saying that 'the government may not make distinctions on the basis 
of race, ' are the very .same ones who supposedly champion the jurispru­
dence of original understanding. But here, without excuse, without a 
word of explanation, they adopt a highly unoriginalist position, and they 
ought at least to be candid in doing so.13 
Rubenfeld argues that the equal protection clause, under his para­
digm case method, is about stopping purposeful discrimination against 
minorities. Affirmative action, to benefit minorities, does not offend 
this conception of equal protection. Indeed, Rubenfeld writes: "Some­
thing has gone profoundly wrong in constitutional interpretation when 
the Fourteenth Amendment is read, as it is today, to make racial mi-
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. P. 202. This is a point that was developed in. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Gov­
ernment's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 
477 (1998). 
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norities virtually the only minorities in our entire legal system that 
cannot be singled out for favorable treatment" (p. 218). 
Finally, Chapter Twelve presents Rubenfeld's views of constitu­
tional interpretation with regard to privacy and particularly abortion 
rights. Rubenfeld argues that the Constitution should be understood 
as containing an "anti-totalitarian right of privacy" - "a right of each 
person not to have a particular life imposed on him" (p. 239). 
Rubenfeld argues that from this perspective laws prohibiting abortion 
are unconstitutional because such laws have "invasive, far-reaching 
prescriptive, indeed conscriptive effects. It compels this woman to 
bear a child. It forces motherhood upon her" (p. 225). Rubenfeld 
maintains that statutes prohibiting abortion go further than any other 
law in their "conscriptive, life-occupying effects" (p. 225). 
Thus, in just 250 pages Rubenfeld covers everything from the rea­
sons for having a Constitution to how it should be interpreted to the 
resolution of the most controversial issues such as affirmative action 
and abortion. The argument is logically structured, though the book is 
not an easy read; the writing is dense and often abstract. I found my­
self having to read some passages several times to try to understand 
Rubenfeld's points. 
II. WHAT DOES RUBENFELD ADD TO CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY? 
Professor Rubenfeld's book is unquestionably impressive in his 
weaving together continental philosophy, economic game theory, and 
history to justify his conclusions. He invents a new vocabulary, such ·as 
the distinction between a "speech" orientation and a "written" orien­
tation and_ his "paradigm case method of interpretation." His progres­
sive conclusions make it appealing - at least for liberals - to say that 
he's got it right. 
But, on reflection, the theory is not nearly as original or as effec­
tive as Professor Rubenfeld purports. First, although he is right to 
challenge the definition of democracy as majority rule, this is not new 
and it is not aided by drawing a distinction between "speech" and 
"written" views. Second, Rubenfekl's conception of commitment fails 
for the same reason he criticizes others: people today did not commit 
themselves to the Constitution. His artificial construct of a unified 
American "people" - which is the crucial step in his argument -
does not wo_rk on a theoretical or practical level. Third, the paradigm 
case method of constitutional interpretation is just another way of 
phrasing "modified originalism" - constitutional interpretation 
should be true to the central goal for each provision, even though it 
need not follow the particular views of the drafters (even if they could 
be known). As Dworkin put it, for each constitutional principle there 
is a central concept that should be followed, but there is not the need 
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to adhere to the specific conceptions of the Framers.14 Rubenfeld's 
paradigm case method seems little different than this, except that it is 
not as clearly explained. I will consider each of these points individu­
ally. 
A. Judicial Review and the Meaning of Democracy 
If democracy is defined as majority rule, no theory can succeed in 
solving the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Unelected federal judges 
invalidating the actions of popularly elected officials is inherently at 
odds with majority rule. It does not matter whether the court is fol­
lowing an originalist or a nonoriginalist philosophy; either way, a judi­
ciary that is not electorally accountable is striking down the choices of 
elected officials. Under originalist review, this may occur less often, 
but when it happens, it is no less at odds with majority rule. 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, the problem with the obses­
sion with the counter-majoritarian difficulty is that it is based on a 
misdefinition of democracy as majority rule.15 Neither descriptively 
nor normatively is majority rule a proper definition of American de­
mocracy. Descriptively, the Constitution does not reflect a commit­
ment to majority rule. There is no provision within the Constitution 
for national referenda or initiatives to allow the majority to be in­
volved in government decisionmaking. There never has been anything 
at the federal level like the initiative process that exists in many states 
to allow the majority to vote on laws. 
The reason for this is simple: the Framers of the Constitution were 
deeply distrustful of pure majority rule. The Federalist Papers, for ex­
ample, repeatedly emphasize the dangers of unchecked majority rule.16 
The Constitution they created, for the most part, rejects majority rule. 
The President is chosen by the electoral college, not the popular vote 
of the people. The result, of course, is that today - like a few times 
earlier in American history - we have a president who received fewer 
popular votes than his prime opponent. Senators initially were se­
lected by state legislatures and even today the allocation of two sena­
tors per state ensures that the Senate is not representative of the ma­
jority of the population. Federal judges are chosen by the President 
and approved by the Senate, with no direct role for the people. It is 
impossible descriptively to see this structure of government as re-
14. RO NALD DWORKI N, TAKI NG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978). 
15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAR V. L. REV. 
43, 74-77 (1989); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on 
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEXAS L. RE V. 1207, 1211-26 (1984). See 
generally ERWI N CHEMERI NSKY, INTERPRETI NG THE CO NSTITUTIO N (1987). 
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15-16, at 78-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 49, at 281-85 (James Madison). 
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fleeting a commitment to democracy defined as majority rule. The 
very existence of the Bill of Rights was to put limits on the majority's 
ability to restrict individual freedom. Justice Robert Jackson put this 
eloquently when he wrote: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts. One 's right to life, liberty, and property, to 
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote: they depend on the 
outcome of no election.17 
Nor normatively is such a conception desirable. The United States 
should be understood as a constitutional democracy, a system where 
the choices of the majority and their elected officials are allowed only 
so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. The definition of 
American democracy thus s.hould include both a belief in majority rule 
and also a commitment to protecting fundamental values - such as 
fundamental rights, equality, and separation of powers - from the 
majority.18 Normatively, it is desirable to have a conception of democ­
racy that focuses on both the processes of government and the sub­
stantive values that the Constitution protects. 
If democracy is understood this way, then judicial review safe­
guarding rights or advancing equality is actually consistent with 
American democracy. Put another way, the Constitution itself is in­
consistent with defining democracy as majority rule because the 
Constitution is an inherently anti-majoritarian document. No one alive 
today voted for it and a majority cannot change it. Judicial review en­
forcing an anti-majoritarian document always will be anti­
majoritarian. But isn't it peculiar, inaccurate, and undesirable to de­
fine American "democracy" in a way that makes the Constitution it­
self seem deviant? If instead the very definition of democracy includes 
the Constitution, then judicial review enforcing it is consistent, and not 
at odds, with democracy. 
Rubenfeld essentially makes this point when he argues that de­
mocracy should not be defined as the voice of current majorities. He 
notes that "in a society that aspires to governance by the present voice 
of the people, this self-addressed self-written law, the one that marks 
the day of every legitimate popular assembly, is foundationally prob­
lematic" (p. 77). He thus argues that the conception of democracy 
17. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
18. Mark Tushnet has powerfully developed this point: "Such a view of democracy has 
seemed inadequate to most political theorists, who argue that democracy, properly con­
ceived, requires the protection of some fundamental but nonpolitical rights." MARK 
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AN D BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 
(1988). 
1258 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100.:1249 
cannot be based on the speech model which focuses on having the 
government follow the views of the majority. He argues instead that 
the proper understanding of the Constitution is as a written commit­
ment. 
This distinction between a "speech" -oriented view and a "written" -
oriented view is at the very core of Rubenfeld's argument. But I do 
not see what it adds to attacking the definition of democracy as ma­
jority rule. In fact, a distinction between the spoken and written word 
seems inherently arbitrary. Why should so much depend on the way in 
which the communication occurs? Both spoken and written forms of 
communication can be about following the views of the current ma­
jority and either could also be about forming an enduring commit­
ment. Binding commitments can be made orally and writings need not 
be binding over time. Statutes are in writing, but they can be changed 
by a majority of the current legislature at any point in time. 
In other words, the appropriate distinction is between democracy 
defined as majority rule and democracy defined to include the endur­
ing commitments contained in the Constitution. I think that the latter 
is preferable, both descriptively and normatively to the former, but I 
don't see what is added by labeling these "speech" as opposed to 
"writing." 
B. Is There an Enduring American "People"? 
My strongest criticism of Rubenfeld's book is his reliance on a fic­
tional concept of an American people that transcends time to justify 
the Constitution and judicial review and to resolve the counter­
majoritarian difficulty. Rubenfeld's argument that the Constitution 
should be seen as a "commitment" is not new. Many have developed 
this argument.19 For example, as Rubenfeld recognizes, many have 
analogized the Constitution to the story of Ulysses having himself 
bound to the mast so as to not be tempted by the Siren songs that 
lured sailors to their death on the rocky shoals.20 Rubenfeld quotes 
Stephen Holmes's characterization of this: "A constitution is Peter so­
ber while the electorate is Peter drunk. Citizens need a constitution, 
just as Ulysses needed to be bound to his mast. "21 
Rubenfeld says, though, that "the venerable Ulyssean analogy is 
inapt and misleading" (p. 116). But how is Rubenfeld's theory differ­
ent from the Ulysses analogy? He says: "[T]he point on which I want 
19. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 11,  at 94-96; TRIBE, supra note 10, at 18-24; Thomas C. 
Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J. ECON. & ORO. 357 (1985). 
20. The story is from Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII, lines 141-200 (Harper Colophon 
ed. 1975). The analogy to the Constitution is most developed in ELSTER, supra note 11 .  
21 .  P .  116 n.26 (quoting STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE 
THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 135 (1995)). 
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to focus is this: nowhere in this story of reason and passion does 
Ulysses's action of self-binding provide him with a reason to act" 
(pp. 1 16-17). Rubenfeld elaborates: "The ropes that hold Ulysses 
when he hears the Sirens explain why he stays on board the ship in a 
causal sense; they do not supply a reason in a normative sense" (p. 
1 17). 
This argument, however, is problematic because the normative 
reason for adhering to the commitment seems clear: it is desirable to 
make certain choices in advance and then adhere to them to avoid an­
ticipated harms. For Ulysses, this was the choice to avoid death, while 
still being able to hear the Siren song, by having himself tied to the 
mast. The normative desirability of this is obvious. The Constitution 
allows society to protect its long-term commitments and precious val­
ues from its anticipated short-term impulses to compromise them. 
Rubenfeld also says that "Ulyssean pre-commitment appeals to ra­
tionality as against the seduction of transient passion. Commitment 
appeals to passion as against the seduction of rationality - of every­
day, cost-benefit, preference-maximizing rationality" (p. 129; emphasis 
omitted). But this seems an arbitrary and false distinction. In making 
commitments (or pre-commitments), there can be both passion and 
rationality. Marriage, an example frequently used by Rubenfeld to il­
lustrate the concept of commitment, would, for most people, include 
both. Likewise, the commitment (or pre-commitment) found in the 
Constitution makes it difficult for us to later change our mind for rea­
sons of either passion or rationality. Again, this is like being married, 
which may cause us to stay in a relationship evenwhen passions or ra­
tional self-interest might point us to other choices. 
Rubenfeld distinguishes his approach to commitment from the 
Ulysses analogy, and ultimately defends much of his theory, by con­
tending that there is an on-going American "people" of which we are 
all a part. He says that "a people might be regarded as a collective 
agent, persisting over time, able to make and to live under its own 
commitments" (p. 93). He says that "[c]ommitmentarian democracy 
holds that a people, understood as an agent existing over time, across 
generations, is the proper subject of democratic self-government" 
(p. 145). He argues that just as a person changes over time, but still 
remains the same individual, so can a "people" change but remain a 
single entity. He writes: "To recognize a people as a subject persisting 
over time, despite the heterogeneity of its composition, is ultimately 
no more mystical than recognizing individuals as subjects persisting 
over time despite the heterogeneity of their composition" (p. 158). 
This concept of an American "people" does great work in 
Rubenfeld's theory. It goes to his central thesis about the role of time; 
he sees a people that transcends time and does not simply exist at a 
particular moment. The notion of a "people" also provides an easy an-
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swer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty: the Constitution, then, is 
our commitment, and enforcing it is not contrary to our will. 
Although the notion of an enduring "people" is romantic, it 
doesn't work because it is purely a fictional construct. The vast major­
ity of those present today did not have ancestors here at the founding. 
Professor Tribe puts this well when he writes: "For it is not we, but 
people who are long dead who tied us to this mast - not an alien spe­
cies, to be sure, but not ourselves either . . . .  For the truth is that we as 
individuals are likely to have written, and voted to ratify, not a single 
word of the document to which we swear allegiance as the 
Constitution of the United States."22 Native Americans who were pre­
sent were excluded from participation, as were women, blacks, and 
others. Rubenfeld must assume a degree of homogeneity, of some 
sort, among people engaged in the framing and people now that defies 
reality. 
To be fair, Rubenfeld recognizes this when he states: "There is and 
always will be something intensely self-delusive in the suggestion that 
"Americans" compose a single people engaged in a protracted, 
centuries-long struggle for self-government. This delusion inevitably 
helps suppress everything we know about America's mistreatment of 
those excluded, now as well as then, from the Constitution's 'People.' 
The exclusion of a majority of persons from the constitution-making 
processes of the 1780s will always eat away at America's legitimacy" 
(p. 158). 
But Rubenfeld brushes this aside by saying that over time there 
became an American "people." He says: "But if a nation had to be 
born at a single founding moment, it could never be born at all" 
(p. 158). He then writes, in a key passage justifying his concept of an 
American people: "Today we are all Jews and blacks; we are all mi­
norities infesting a region that others wish they could have for them­
selves. We are all members of a historical people, taking part in that 
nation's sins and glory" (p. 159). 
Again, it sounds romantic, but it also seems clearly wrong. We are 
not all Jews and we are not all black - not in a fictional sense and cer­
tainly not in a real sense. Individuals are often treated differently be­
cause of their race or ethnicity and as a result they often experience 
the world differently. As I drive down the streets of Los Angeles, I am 
not going to be stopped by its police officers solely because of my race, 
but those with black or brown skin very well may be stopped. Indeed, 
because of our different experiences, we often will view constitutional 
issues differently. Rubenfeld, of course, would not deny this; he would 
say that it does not refute that there is such a thing as the American 
"people." 
22. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 24. 
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But this then· becomes entirely an argument from definition. 
Rubenfeld defines an enduring "American people" and then uses that 
definition to great advantage in explaining why a commitment over 
time is desirable. The problem is that the definition seems so at odds 
with reality. To use the simplest example, contrary to what Rubenfeld 
says, we are not and never all will be Jews or blacks or minorities. In a 
nation as divided as America, now and historically, it is fictional to de­
fine the country as consisting of a unitary people persisting over time. 
C. A Method of Constitutional Interpretation 
Rubenfeld's book also describes his approach to interpreting the 
Constitution: "the paradigm case method" (p. 178). He says that for 
every constitutional provision there is a "paradigm case" and that 
courts should discern and reason from it in deciding constitutional 
cases. He writes: "This method takes as foundational only commit­
ments - and more specifically, only those commitments made in the 
course of the historical struggles that actuated the Founder's 
constitution-writing" (pp. 186-87). 
However, Rubenfeld's description of the paradigm case method is 
unfortunately very sketchy. For example, Rubenfeld never explains 
how a court is to determine the paradigm case for a particular consti­
tutional provision. Equally important, Rubenfeld never explains the 
appropriate level of abstraction to use in stating a paradigm case. An 
originalist might use Framers' intent to define the paradigm case and 
then state it at a very narrow level of abstraction. For example, an 
originalist might see the paradigm case for the equal protection clause 
as protecting former slaves from discrimination, thus excluding the 
protection of other groups. Rubenfeld sees the paradigm case for the 
equal protection clause as eliminating the black codes (p. 182). But 
how is the choice to be made as to which is the better "paradigm 
case?" Rubenfeld never explains. Nor is there any explanation as to 
how courts are to use the paradigm case method, even assuming that a 
paradigm case can be discerned. 
Rubenfeld's paradigm case method seems very similar to "abstract 
originalism" - the idea that courts should follow the Framer's general 
goal for each constitutional provision, but need not adhere to their 
specific views. This was captured in Dworkin's notion that there is a 
"concept" for every constitutional provision that should be followed, 
but that the specific "conceptions" of the Framers need not be con­
trolling.23 Paul Brest termed this approach "moderate originalism."24 
Although Rubenfeld uses different terminology, there does not seem 
23. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 134-36. 
24. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. RE V. 
204, 205 (1980). 
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to be any meaningful difference between his approach and the earlier 
descriptions. 25 
Of course, every court interpreting the Constitution thinks that 
what it is doing is consistent with the concept behind a constitutional 
provision.26 Each could articulate a "paradigm case," at some level of 
abstraction, to justify any conclusion.27 Absent any description of how 
to derive and assess a paradigm case, Rubenfeld's approach adds little 
except a new phrase. 
III. THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
I confess to being a skeptic as to whether there ever will be a uni­
fied theory of constitutional law that answers all of the questions that 
Professor Rubenfeld addresses. Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld's effort 
makes me even more doubtful. 
Ultimately, the purpose of constitutional theory is to give guidance 
as to how courts should interpret the Constitution in specific cases. 
But no overarching theory can answer, or give guidance as to how to 
answer, the hard questions of constitutional law. Consider a few ex­
amples from recent Supreme Court decisions. Does sovereign immu­
nity bar suits against unconsenting state governments in state courts?28 
Should the First Amendment protect the media's broadcasting of a 
tape of a conversation illegally intercepted and recorded if it concerns 
a matter of public importance?29 Is the execution of the mentally re­
tarded cruel and unusual punishment?30 
I do not see how any desirable constitutional theory can answer 
these questions. Each inescapably involves a value choice - whether 
to favor immunity over accountability, whether to favor speech over 
25. The same criticisms that could be advanced at all nonoriginalist (or moderate origi­
nalist) constitutional interpretation could be directed at Rubenfeld's theory: the lack of any 
significant constraint on the judges. I share Rubenfeld's belief in nonoriginalist judicial re­
view so I do not mean to criticize him for this. But it is surprising that Rubenfeld makes no 
attempt to answer this· argument, which conservative constitutional theorists undoubtedly 
would make in response to his theory. 
26. Tribe, for example , speaks of "the inescapability of moderate originalism." TRIBE, 
supra note 10, at 51. 
27. Nor does Rubenfeld address the key question in any theory of constitutional inter­
pretation: the level of abstraction at which a principle is to be stated. See LAURENCE TRIBE 
& MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (discussing the importance of 
the choice of the level of abstraction). 
28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state governments cannot be sued 
in state court, even on federal claims, without their consent). 
29. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (noting the First Amendment precludes the 
imposition of civil liability for using or disclosing the contents of illegally intercepted com­
munications on a person who was not involved in the interception, but who knew or had rea­
son to know that the int_e_rception was unlawful). 
30. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). 
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privacy, whether to protect the individual or the state's choice of pun­
ishment. Deciding each of these questions - like almost all constitu­
tional issues - requires making a value choice. There is no way to 
avoid that. 
Some, such as originalists, may try to hide their choices in the cloak 
of a claimed neutral methodology. But as many have shown, origi­
nalists are making value choices and simply masking them in the lan­
guage of Framers' intent. As Dworkin said, there is not a Framers' in­
tent out there to be discovered; it is created and the creator does so in 
a way to advance his or her value choices. Think of Justice Antonin 
Scalia: he finds in his theory of original meaning a Constitution that 
forbids affirmative action, allows bans on abortion, permits school 
prayer and aid to parochial schools. Surely it is not coincidence that 
these also happen to be his, and other conservatives', political views. 
Constitutional decisionmaking is all about value choices. Should 
equal protection be seen as prohibiting government-mandated segre­
gation? This is not answered in the text or the Framers' intent or by 
paradigm cases or any other theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Brown v. Board of Education was a value choice. In allowing the Boy 
Scouts to exclude gays, the Supreme Court made a value choice to fa­
vor the group's right to make discriminatory choices over the right of 
gays to be free from discrimination. Plain and simple, that's what Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale was about.31 Every time the Court balances, 
such as in deciding what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
or in deciding whether intermediate or strict scrutiny is met, a value 
choice is being made. 
This is not to say that there is no role or importance for constitu­
tional theory. Constitutional theory can explain why it is desirable to 
have an institution, like the judiciary, making value choices. 
Rubenfeld's book offers such an explanation in describing the impor­
tance of making and adhering to commitments over time. But consti­
tutional theory cannot avoid the need for courts to make value choices 
in deciding cases. Nor ·Can constitutional theory provide the content 
for those value choices. That should be the primary focus of constitu­
tional scholarship: debating and illuminating the value choices that 
courts should make in interpreting the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
I liked Professor Rubenfeld's book more than may seem from this 
Review. I was dazzled by his ability to integrate continental philoso­
phy, modern economics, and social psychology, among other disci­
plines, into a theory of constitutional law. I was awed by his auda­
ciousness in claiming to reject all prior constitutional theories and 
31. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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develop his own and to try to accomplish so many tasks in such a short 
book. I learned a great deal from this book. 
Yet, in the end, I was frustrated by the book because although I 
wanted him to succeed, it just isn't possible. There is not a grand the­
ory of constitutional law that can justify the Constitution's existence, 
warrant the existence of judicial review, resolve the counter­
majoritarian difficulty, offer a method of judicial interpretation, and 
support affirmative action and abortion rights. Not today, not ever. 
